The NLRB has overruled Browning Ferris and returned to its previous standard for determining joint employer status. For more information, see our Management Alert here.
In yet another significant decision overturning a controversial Obama-era ruling, the NLRB has reverted to its prior standards in determining what will be an appropriate bargaining unit for union organizing and bargaining. PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (December 15, 2017). Just a day before his term on the Board ended leaving a vacancy and 2-2 split among its members, Chairman Miscimarra along with the two newest Board members appointed by President Trump — over the sharp dissent of the Board’s two Democratic members — reversed the so-called “micro bargaining unit” test set out in Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011). It’s now a Big(ger) Ba(rgaini)ng Theory, or as Sheldon Cooper might say: Bazinga!
By way of background, bargaining units are the identifiable groups of employees that unions can organize, represent, and bargain for at an employer’s facility or facilities. While the National Labor Relations Act for the most part does not define the specific requirements for who can be included in or excluded from any individual unit, it instead looks at whether the group shares enough common working conditions or “an appropriate community of interests.” Those interests can include an almost limitless number of factors, ranging from the employer’s organizational, management and supervisory structure to which parking lots, break rooms or time clocks certain groups of employees use. Sometimes a union may represent all employees except managers and supervisors who work at a single location. Other times, they may represent just a particular craft (e.g., electricians), type of worker (e.g., clerical), or alternatively employees who work at multiple of the employer’s locations. Likewise, at any individual facility, an employer may be required to deal and negotiate separate labor agreements with (and face the possibility of a strike from) multiple different unions and bargaining units.
The composition of a bargaining unit is significant for both organizing and bargaining. Under the NLRA, it does not need to be the “most” appropriate unit, merely “an” appropriate unit. When a union files an organizing petition with the NLRB, it has invariably self-selected the group of employees where the union feels it has the best chance of winning a representation election. Often, this may be a smaller group within any facility. Under Specialty Healthcare, the NLRB had ruled that so long as any group that a union selected was minimally appropriate, it would not entertain an employer’s objections unless it could establish that other employees shared “an overwhelming” community of interest with the group the union wanted to represent. As cases under Specialty Healthcare found, working conditions need to “overlap almost completely” so that there was “no legitimate basis” for excluding others from the group the union sought to represent. In effect, a union could often select a small group of employees within a much larger group, succeed in organizing them, and then it or other unions could try later to organize either other individual groups or the rest of the employees. Divide and conquer. Employers were faced with a greater likelihood of negotiating and administering different labor agreements with multiple individual bargaining units at the same facility.
In PCC Structurals, the NLRB reverted to its historical way of assessing any group that a union may seek to represent, looking at both the commonalities and differences in the employment relationship that the group shares with other coworkers. In that case, the union sought to represent roughly 100 of over 2500 employees working at three of the employer’s facilities in Oregon. These 100 employees worked in different departments and had different supervisors, each of whom was responsible for supervising other employees that the union did not seek to represent. In rejecting the Specialty Healthcare test under which the smaller group was found appropriate, the Board emphasized that each case will need to be assessed individually and that a smaller unit will not necessarily be appropriate. Bigger may be better. Bazinga!
By: Brian Stolzenbach, Esq.
Seyfarth Synopsis: On Friday, December 1, 2017, newly appointed NLRB General Counsel Peter Robb issued a memo containing a broad overview of his initial agenda as General Counsel. It previews many anticipated developments during the Trump Administration, which our blog will be exploring over the next three weeks.
In keeping with the tradition of prior General Counsels (see here (GC 16-01), here (GC 14-01), and here (GC 11-11) for prior memos from President Obama’s appointees), Mr. Robb provided the NLRB’s Regional Offices with a list of issues that must be submitted to his Division of Advice for consideration before proceeding to issue a complaint in an unfair labor practice case. Although the Regional Offices are instructed to issue complaints in accordance with extant law (i.e., the law created by the NLRB during the Obama Administration), Mr. Robb suggests that he “might want to provide the Board with an alternative analysis.” As usual when the General Counsel’s office flips from Democrat to Republican or vice versa, the memo basically provides a list of important case law developments from the prior administration that are likely to be overturned. Here, Mr. Robb identifies nearly 30 such cases covering 15 important subjects for employers.
In addition, Mr. Robb immediately rescinds seven prior memos issued by President Obama’s appointees and revokes five initiatives set forth in other memos issued by the General Counsel’s Division of Advice during the Obama Administration.
As the numbers above suggest, a full explanation of Mr. Robb’s five-page memo is far more than a single blog can handle. Seyfarth Shaw labor lawyers will be posting an item on this blog each weekday for the next three weeks, exploring a different aspect of the memo each day.
P.S. If you just can’t wait and need a full and complete analysis of the memo more quickly, don’t hesitate to drop your friendly neighborhood Seyfarth labor lawyer a note. Any of us would be glad to oblige.
Seyfarth Synopsis: Recognizing the rise of Millennials and the increasing diversity of the workforce, some labor unions appear to be taking a keen interest in increasing the diversity of those in their leadership ranks, which is at least in part a key organizing tactic.
As part of Seyfarth’s FutureEmployer initiative, we’ve been taking a look at how the changing makeup of the workforce is and might be affecting union organizing activity, and what employers can and should do in response. One key change in the workforce is the rise in Millennials: it’s estimated that by 2025, they will make up 75% of the workforce. And they’re also the most diverse adult generation to date. But interestingly, even though they appear to have relatively favorable views of organized labor, many of them have not fallen prey to union organizing. At least not yet.
Unions appear to be cluing in to this, and they’re responding accordingly. In a recent article published in Bloomberg BNA’s Daily Labor Report, Maria Somma, the first Asian organizing director for the United Steelworkers, was quoted as saying “There’s a saying within the labor movement: male, pale, and stale . . . that has been our union. But that’s not who our union is now. It’s also not who our movement is going to be.” Union leaders were also quoted as saying that if the union movement is going to survive and thrive, unions have to establish mentorship opportunities to groom young, minority members to take over.
And at least some unions appear to be putting their money where their mouth is. For example, the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades currently has its first black president, and it also has three women of color who are under the age of 35 leading its strategic organizing division. Similarly, the American Federation of School Administrators currently has its first black female president, the SEIU is currently led by its first female president, and the National Education Association is currently led by its first Latina president. The BNA article also reported that according to the AFL-CIO, approximately 47% of the delegates at its recent convention were women or people of color, and 7 of its more than 50 affiliate unions are led by women. And not surprisingly, diversity was a major topic of discussion throughout the AFL-CIO’s recent convention.
Given that it looks like union leadership is starting to recognize this demographic shift in the workforce and is promoting younger, more diverse individuals into leadership positions in response, it might be wise for employers to ask themselves if they should be doing the same within their own leadership ranks, both as a union avoidance strategy and as good business practice.
Seyfarth Synopsis: With the NBA season opener just over a month away, at least one team could be getting an unexpected influx of free agents. In Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball, LP, 365 NLRB No. 124 (2017), the Board recently held that the production crew responsible for operating the Timberwolves’ center court video display were employees under the National Labor Relations Act and could form a bargaining unit to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.
The Minnesota Timberwolves, like most professional sports teams, has a large video display in the center of its arena to broadcast live game footage, player statistics, replays, advertisements, and fan favorites like the kiss cam during games. Behind all of these visual effects are sixteen crewmembers who operate video cameras in the arena and direct what video gets displayed during the games.
The Timberwolves maintain a roster of about 51 crewmembers with the skills to operate the video display. The team circulates a game schedule at the beginning of each season and the individual crewmembers decide which, if any, games they will work. Most perform production work for other entities when not working for the Timberwolves. For each game, the team sets the crewmembers’ start time and pays a set fee, which varies based on the game and position crewmembers hold. The team also provides the crewmembers with a basic game plan prior to each game outlining the timing of some of the promotions it wants to broadcast. But the crew maintains significant control over what makes it onto the video display during the game.
In February of 2016 the crewmembers sought to enlist an agent, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employers, to form a union. The team appealed to its referee, the NLRB, claiming that the crewmembers where independent contractors under the Act and, therefore could not unionize. The Regional Director, whistled the crewmembers’ play dead, holding that they were not employees. The crewmembers sought a booth review from the Board.
The Board has long applied common law agency principals to decide if an employee-employer relationship exists. It considers eleven “non-exclusive” factors, none of which is “decisive:” (1) the extent of control by the employer; (2) whether the individual is engaged in a distinct business; (3) the level of supervision from the employer; (4) skills required in the occupation; (5) who provides the tools, equipment, and work place; (6) the length of employees’ employment; (7) method of payment; (8) whether the work is part of the employer’s regular business; (9) whether the parties believe an independent contractor relationship exists; (10) whether the principal is in business; and (11) whether the employee renders services as part of an entrepreneurial business with opportunity for gain or loss.
Two of the Board’s pro-union members used these sprawling factors to overturn the Regional Director’s decision. They acknowledged that crewmembers exhibited some characteristics of independent contractors. The crew retained control over which games they worked, did not receive Timberwolves’ credentials, handbooks or written guidelines, and completed W-9 and 1099 forms for tax purposes. But the majority held that the amount of control the team exerted over the crewmembers, along with the “essential component” crewmembers provided to the team’s business, rendered the crew employees under the Act. The majority emphasized that the team provided guidance to the crew prior to and sometimes during games, and characterized running the video board as “plainly among the [Team’s] central business concerns.” It also noted other things, like the team-dictated start time of each member’s shift, the team-set pay for each game, and the team-provided tools necessary to perform the crewmembers’ jobs.
Chairman Miscimarra cried foul. Also emphasizing the control factor, he noted that the relevant issue was not whether the Timberwolves helped shape the final product that was displayed on the video board by providing a broad outline to the crew; such high level control is a hallmark of any independent contractor relationship. Instead, what should matter is the control over the details of the work. And in this case, he would have held the possession arrow pointed decidedly toward independent contractor status. During each game, crewmembers determine things like which video feeds to broadcast, what shots to capture, and other aspects of the live coverage. Chairman Miscimarra also rejected the majority’s view that the crewmembers’ function was central to the team’s business; without the crew, the team would still play basketball in the arena and the television broadcast would proceed uninterrupted. In Chairman Miscimarra’s opinion, these facts, when combined with things like the crew’s ability to choose their schedules, their per-game payment structure, and lack of any meaningful supervision from the team, “substantially outweighed” any factor supporting employee status.
The decision does not dramatically change the Board’s employee/independent contractor jurisprudence. Instead, it highlights the perils of asking any referee, whether basketball or judicial, to apply an eleven factor test to anything. It is inherently unpredictable and open to the whims of hometown (for Basketball) or political party (for the Board) biases. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that even a more reasonable Board will completely abandon a multi-factor employee test. Therefore, the Timberwolves decision should act as a reminder to employers to carefully analyze their independent contractor relationships and ensure that the contractors retain as much control over the terms and conditions of their employment as business necessity permits.
By: Bryan Bienias, Esq.
Seyfarth Synopsis: The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied a broad definition of who constitutes a statutory “guard” under the NLRA, finding that security technicians at two Las Vegas casinos were guards who could not be represented by a non-guard union.
Hotels and other employers may now have an extra layer of security against union intrusions into the workplace: security technicians.
In Bellagio v. NLRB, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that security technicians at two Las Vegas casinos are “guards” who performed “an essential step in the procedure for the enforcement of the employer’s rules” and could not be represented by a non-guard union under the National Labor Relations Act.
The technicians at each casino were responsible for maintaining comprehensive security camera coverage, controlling access to all sensitive areas, maintaining alarm systems, and assisting with “special operations” to help spy on fellow employees suspected of misconduct. The techs did not, however, carry weapons or handcuffs, patrol the resorts, restrain or physically confront guests or swindlers, or monitor security footage for wrongdoing.
The Board found that the techs did not have sufficient authority to “enforce” company rules required to be “guards” under the Act, stating their duties involve merely installing and maintaining security and surveillance cameras and equipment.
Reversing the Board, the Court found that the Board took “an overly narrow view” of the NLRA’s guard provision. The Court noted that the Board relied too heavily on evidence that techs didn’t “perform traditional functions” like carrying a gun and making rounds, gave too little weight to the critical role the techs play in deterring criminal activity at the casinos, failed to account for security needs of highly-sophisticated casinos that house priceless valuables and protect the safety of “revelrous guests,” and ignored the “crucial fact” that the techs help enforce rules against their coworkers, particularly during special operations.
The ruling could significantly impact the organizing activities of non-guard unions seeking to represent security techs or similar workers at casinos, banks, or other industries utilizing cybersecurity and other modern security measures. Employers should analyze whether any security or surveillance technicians or specialists perform “an essential step” in the procedure for enforcing rules and be prepared to challenge representation petitions by traditionally non-guard unions seeking to include such employees in the bargaining unit.
By: Andrew R. Cockroft, Esq.
Seyfarth Synopsis: On June 7, 2017, the Board held that in order to comply with the Board’s Election Rules, an employer may need to search the phones of supervisors to identify the phone numbers of eligible voters, even if said supervisors have not been deemed “supervisors” within the meaning of the NLRA.
Under the Board’s Election Rules employers are now required to supply a plethora of information to a union prior to a representation election, including “available home and personal cellular (‘cell’) telephone numbers of all eligible voters.” For some employers, this information may be readily accessible and it can be produced to the union with ease. For others, finding the cellular phone numbers of eligible voters may not be so easy.
The Board’s recent ruling in RHCG Safety Corp., 365 NLRB No. 88 (2017), makes that process even more difficult. The Board held that if the employer does not maintain a database containing the cellular phone numbers of eligible voters, but knows that a workplace supervisor maintains the contact information of eligible voters on his cellular phone, the employer is required to ask and (if that fails) search the supervisor’s phone.
In RHCG Safety Corp., when a representation election resulted in a loss for the union, the union objected to the results of the election on the grounds that the employer failed to provide eligible voters’ cellular phone numbers as part of the voter list. The employer argued that it had no obligation to include the phone numbers because it did not maintain its employees’ phone numbers in its computer database. Consequently, the phone numbers were not “available” to the employer within the meaning of the Board’s rules.
The Board, without citing to any precedent for support, rejected this argument. According to the Board, the phone numbers were “available” to the employer because it knew that its workplace supervisors maintained those numbers on their own phones.
Chairman Miscimarra dissented and elaborated on several problems with the Board’s newfound interpretation of “available” and the obligations imposed on employers.
First, he explained that such a rule would be nearly impossible to comply with given that employers have two days after entering into a stipulated election agreement to provide the list.
Second, under the new Election Rules, an employer might not know who constitutes a supervisor under the Act, because the Rules require the parties to wait until after the election to resolve most questions of voter eligibility and supervisory status. Accordingly, employers won’t know whether they can ask certain individuals to provide it with the phone numbers of the bargaining unit employees.
Chairman Miscimarra explained how employers are placed in a Catch-22:
- If an employer believes that an employee is not a supervisor and therefore refrains from demanding a search of his or her phones for coworkers’ personal phone numbers, and if the union loses the election, the union is likely to object to the election results by contending that the employee is a supervisor and that the voter list erroneously omitted employees’ personal phone numbers stored on the supervisor’s phones.
- If the employer believes that the employee is a supervisor and requires a search of his phones resulting in the discovery of numerous coworker personal phone numbers, and if the union loses the election, the union is likely to object to the election results by contending that the employee is not a supervisor, and the compelled search of the employee’s phones and forced disclosure of coworkers’ personal phone numbers constituted unlawful surveillance or other unlawful interference under Section 7 of the Act.
- Employer Takeaway: This decision highlights how difficult it is to comply with the Election Rules, and in particular, with providing a complete list of all phone numbers. An employer faced with an upcoming election and the possibility of asking its supervisors to search their phones (or any other devices) for eligible voters’ contact information, should seek legal advice before doing so.
Seyfarth Synopsis: Congressional Committee Head Virginia Foxx (R-NC) and Subcommittee Chair Tim Walberg (R-MI) ask NLRB General Counsel Griffin to either immediately rescind his January 31 report regarding the purported rights of faculty, students and scholarship athletes, or “step aside as general counsel.”
Yesterday, we reported that Richard F. Griffith, Jr., the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, issued a report titled “General Counsel’s Report on the Statutory Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context.” A copy of yesterday’s Management Alert can be found here.
It did not take long for Griffin’s Report to catch the attention of Congress. Yesterday, Representative Virginia Foxx (R-NC), Chairwoman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, and Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions, jointly issued a response to the Report, calling for Griffin to “rescind his memorandum immediately” or “step aside as general counsel.” In support of their request, the Representatives jointly stated that the “memorandum puts the interests of union leaders over America’s students, and it has the potential to create significant confusion at college campuses across the nation.”
Even if Griffin refuses to withdraw the Report, it reasonably can be anticipated that the General Counsel appointed by President Trump at the conclusion of Griffin’s appointment in November, or the soon-to-be Trump appointed Board majority, will revisit not only the Report but also the underlying decisions in Pacific Lutheran, Columbia and Northwestern.
Seyfarth Synopsis: In a last minute attempt to leave his mark on the NLRB, the Board’s outgoing General Counsel issued a report attempting to expand the rights of university faculty and students, including scholarship athletes under the National Labor Relations Act.
Just months before the conclusion of his four-year term, Richard F. Griffin, Jr., the General Counsel (“GC”) of the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”), issued a report titled “General Counsel’s Report on the Statutory Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context.”
The January 31, 2017 Report was issued with the stated intent to serve as a “guide for employers, labor unions, and employees that summarizes Board law regarding NLRA employee status in the university setting and explains how the Office of the General Counsel will apply these representational decisions in the unfair labor practice arena.” The decisions covered by the Report – – Pacific Lutheran University, Columbia University, and Northwestern University–all involved efforts of individuals to obtain representation by a union.
In Pacific Lutheran, the Board established a new test for determining when it would take jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities. According to the GC, the Board “will…seek redress for unfair labor practices committed by religious schools against individual faculty member discriminatees who the university does not hold out as performing a specific role in creating and maintaining the university’s religious and educational environment.”
As a practical matter, this means that the GC believes that the faculty who are able to seek union representation because they were “not hired to advance the school’s religious purposes,” also are protected by the Act’s prohibition against discrimination for engaging in protected concerted activities. By implication, this may mean that faculty who are hired to advance a school’s religious purposes are not protected.
The GC also provided his analysis of the standard articulated in Pacific Lutheran regarding the managerial status of faculty members. Specifically, the GC distinguished between managerial faculty (those who “formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer”) and non-managerial faculty (those whose decision-making is limited to “routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned…”).
The GC concluded that, in the unfair labor practice context, a “complaint will not issue against a university if [the Board] determine[s] that an asserted discriminatee is a managerial employee under the Board’s Pacific Lutheran test.” He added, however, that even when the Board refuses to process a certification petition, it will still conduct an individualized analysis of the discriminatee’s employment position to determine whether that individual exercised sufficient managerial authority to exempt him from the NLRA.
Student Assistants. Here, the GC briefly summarized the Columbia University decision, stating that the Board “applied the statutory language of the [NLRA] and longstanding common-law principles to settle the issue of statutory coverage for graduate student employees, determining that student assistants are employees under the NLRA.” The GC relied on the 2000 NYU decision to conclude that graduate students met the common-law test of agency because they “‘perform their duties for, and under the control of’ their university, which in turn pays them for those services…” Similarly, the GC applied this precedent to the unfair labor practices context, concluding that, in his opinion, student assistants are well within the ambit of the NLRA and can therefore organize and receive its protections.
Non-Academic University Workers. The GC stated that, as to university students who are performing non-academic university work (e.g. maintenance or cafeteria workers, lifeguards, campus tour guides, etc.), they are “clearly covered by the NLRA and, as with student assistants, [the Board] will analyze unfair labor practice charges involving non-academic student employees accordingly.” In reaching this conclusion, the GC reasoned that the non-academic university worker category presented an easier question than the student assistants in Columbia as, in his opinion, under the common law agency test, there is no issue of whether or not the work performed by the student employee is “primarily educational work.”
Hospital House Staff. With respect to “hospital house staff” (medical interns, residents, and fellows), the GC concluded that they would “continue to be protected as employees under the NLRA, and [the Board] will continue to process unfair labor practice charges involving those employees.” In reaching this conclusion, the GC reasoned that, just because certain hospital house staff members also happened to be students did not mean that they were exempt from the coverage of the NLRA. He cited the Boston Medical decision, which held that “nothing in the [NLRA] suggests that persons who are students but also employees should be exempted from the coverage and protection of the [NLRA].”
University Football Players. Here, the GC admittedly limits his analysis to the application of the statutory definition of employee and the common-law agency test to find that Division I FBS scholarship football players are employees under the NLRA, and therefore have the rights and protections of that Act. Referring to the Board’s decision in Northwestern, the GC expressly stated that it would be inappropriate for the Report to attempt resolve the sometimes “divisive” questions relating to whether student athletes may organize under the Act.
With Mr. Griffin’s four-year term ending later this year, it is likely that the new GC will want to revisit some or all of the Report. The soon to be Trump-appointed majority of the Board likely will revisit not only the Report, but also the decisions in Pacific Lutheran, Columbia and Northwestern.
By: Jade M. Gilstrap
In the midst of what appears to be a proliferation of “micro-units,” on Tuesday, October 18, 2016, the NLRB declined to reconsider its decision to certify a unit of 14 service technicians employed by the Buena Park Honda dealership in Buena Park, California. Sonic-Buena Park H, Inc. d/b/a Buena Park Honda, 21-RC-178527. In doing so, the Board rejected the employer’s argument that additional employees, particularly lube technicians, should be included in the unit, finding the two types of workers did not share “an overwhelming community interest,” necessitating their inclusion in the same unit.
Relying heavily on Specialty Healthcare & Rehab. Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934, 938 (2011), enfd. 727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013), the majority of the three-member board ruled that the petitioned-for unit of service technicians was appropriate based on an application of the “overwhelming community-of-interest” standard. As articulated in Specialty Healthcare:
When employees or a labor organization petition for an election in a unit of employees who are readily identifiable as a group (based on job classifications, departments, functions, work locations, skills, or similar factors), and the Board finds that the employees in the group share a community of interest after considering the traditional criteria, the Board will find the petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit, despite a contention that employees in the unit could be placed in a larger unit which would also be appropriate or even more appropriate, unless the party so contending demonstrates that employees in the larger unit share an overwhelming community of interest with those in the petitioned-for unit.
Because the facts clearly did not establish that the lube technicians shared an “overwhelming community of interest” with the service technicians, the dealership could not meet this burden. The Board noted that unlike the lube technicians, the service technicians were more skilled, paid substantially higher wages, and required to routinely update and maintain their training and skills, making them “clearly identifiable and functionally distinct.” Accordingly, the Board held, “[i]n denying review, we find that petitioned-for employees are an appropriate unit and the Employer has not sustained its burden of establishing that any of the disputed classifications, either individually or collectively, share an overwhelming community of interest with the petitioned-for employees such that their inclusion in the unit is required.”
Although board member Philip A. Miscimarra agreed that “the interests of the service technicians [were] sufficiently distinct from the excluded employees and otherwise appropriate for inclusion in a separate unit,” he disagreed with the application of Specialty Healthcare and the “overwhelming community of interest” standard to evaluate whether the petitioned-for unit should be required to include additional employees. Instead, Member Miscimarra argued that the Board should have applied its traditional principles, believing “bargaining unit determinations should be circumscribed and guided by industry-specific standards where applicable.”