By: Kaitlyn F. Whiteside, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: On Friday, December 1, 2017, newly appointed NLRB General Counsel Peter Robb issued a memo containing a broad overview of his initial agenda as General Counsel. It previews many anticipated developments during the Trump Administration. Our blog is exploring a different aspect of the memo each day during the first three weeks of December. Click here to find prior posts.

With the publication of Friday’s General Counsel Memorandum (GC Memo 18-02), employers may finally begin to see a much-anticipated shift at the NLRB that many have been waiting on since last year’s election.

Of particular concern for many employers is the NLRB’s interpretation of commonplace work rules contained in employee handbooks. According to newly appointed General Counsel Peter Robb, cases involving some potentially unlawful handbook rules must now be submitted to the Division of Advice.  In particular, GC Memo 18-02 notes that the Division of Advice is interested in cases involving certain rules prohibiting disrespectful conduct, rules prohibiting use of employer trademarks and logos, and no cameras/recording rules.

Perhaps most notably, GC Memo 18-02 expressly rescinds the prior General Counsel guidance concerning employer work rules contained in GC Memorandum 15-04. There, former General Counsel Richard Griffin offered thirty pages of guidance on potentially unlawful workplaces rules under the Board’s standard set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004).

This standard has been criticized in a number of recent dissents, including a lengthy critique by Chairman Miscimarra in William Beaumont Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162 (2016) (see post here). There, then Member Miscimarra advocated for entirely abandoning the Board’s standard in Lutheran Heritage under which the Obama NLRB greatly expanded the scope of workplaces rules considered to be unlawful under the NLRA.

Lutheran Heritage provides that a facially-neutral rule that does not expressly restrict Section 7 activity, was not adopted in response to Section 7 activity, and has not been applied to restrict Section 7 activity, may still be unlawful if employees would reasonably construe the rule as restricting Section 7 activity. In William Beaumont, Chairman Miscimarra suggested that an alternative approach would be to evaluate facially-neutral rules on “(i) the potential adverse impact of the rule on NLRA-protected activity, and (ii) the legitimate justifications an employer may have for maintaining the rule.”

In GC Memo 18-02, the General Counsel appears to suggest that he may support Chairman Miscimarra’s proffered test. The General Counsel specifically notes that the Division of Advice is interested in any cases in which the outcome would be different under the Chairman’s analysis in William Beaumont. The full implications of Chairman Miscimarra’s proposed test for handbook provisions is unknown. What we can say for sure is that the Chairman sees value in the publication of workplace rules and policies and that he has advocated for predictability and practicality, music to many employers’ ears.  With the General Counsel in place and a full five-member Board confirmed by the Senate, employers may have additional reasons to look forward to 2018.

  By: Brian Stolzenbach, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: On Friday, December 1, 2017, newly appointed NLRB General Counsel Peter Robb issued a memo containing a broad overview of his initial agenda as General Counsel. It previews many anticipated developments during the Trump Administration, which our blog will be exploring over the next three weeks.

In keeping with the tradition of prior General Counsels (see here (GC 16-01), here (GC 14-01), and here (GC 11-11) for prior memos from President Obama’s appointees), Mr. Robb provided the NLRB’s Regional Offices with a list of issues that must be submitted to his Division of Advice for consideration before proceeding to issue a complaint in an unfair labor practice case. Although the Regional Offices are instructed to issue complaints in accordance with extant law (i.e., the law created by the NLRB during the Obama Administration), Mr. Robb suggests that he “might want to provide the Board with an alternative analysis.” As usual when the General Counsel’s office flips from Democrat to Republican or vice versa, the memo basically provides a list of important case law developments from the prior administration that are likely to be overturned. Here, Mr. Robb identifies nearly 30 such cases covering 15 important subjects for employers.

In addition, Mr. Robb immediately rescinds seven prior memos issued by President Obama’s appointees and revokes five initiatives set forth in other memos issued by the General Counsel’s Division of Advice during the Obama Administration.

As the numbers above suggest, a full explanation of Mr. Robb’s five-page memo is far more than a single blog can handle. Seyfarth Shaw labor lawyers will be posting an item on this blog each weekday for the next three weeks, exploring a different aspect of the memo each day.

P.S. If you just can’t wait and need a full and complete analysis of the memo more quickly, don’t hesitate to drop your friendly neighborhood Seyfarth labor lawyer a note. Any of us would be glad to oblige.

 

Texting  By: Jennifer M. Holly, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Second Circuit agrees with the Board that the use of profanity in a Facebook post was not “opprobrious enough” to lose the NLRA’s protections and justify the employer’s termination of the employee.

A server whose “conduct [sat] at the outer bounds of protected, union-related comments” when he posted that his manager is a “nasty mother f***er” and “f*** his mother and his entire f***ing family,” was not “opprobrious enough” to lose the protection of the NLRA, a three-judge panel for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in NLRB v. Pier Sixty, LLC, No. 15-1841 (2nd Cir. Apr. 21, 2017).

Pier Sixty operates a catering company in New York, NY. In early 2011, many of its service employees began seeking union representation.  Following a very contentious union organizing campaign, Pier Sixty employees voted to unionize on October 27, 2011.

Two days before the election, during the work day, a Pier Sixty supervisor gave employee Perez and two other servers instructions, which the Board’s opinion described as “harsh tone,” and included the following instructions: “stop chitchatting” and “spread out, move, move.” Approximately 45 minutes later, Perez, upset by the “continuing disrespect for employees,” wrote the following Facebook post about the supervisor during an authorized break:

Bob is such a NASTY MOTHER F***ER don’t know how to talk to people !!!!!! F*** his mother and his entire f***cking family!!!! What a LOSER!!!! Vote YES for the UNION!!!!!!!

The post was publicly accessible and Perez knew that his post would be visible to his coworkers. Perez removed the post three days later. Management, however, had already become aware of the post, and after an investigation, the employer terminated Perez on November 9, 2011.

Perez filed an NLRB charge alleging retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activities. On April 18, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Pier Sixty had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by discharging Perez in retaliation for his protected activity. Pier Sixty filed exceptions, and a three-member panel of the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision on March 31, 2015.  The NLRB filed an application for enforcement, and Pier Sixty filed a cross-petition for review.

The Second Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s determination based on the deference afforded to the ALJ’s factual findings. The Court explained that in light of the General Counsel’s guidance for evaluating employees’ use of social media to post public criticisms of their employers and workplaces, a nine-factor “totality of the circumstances” test in social media cases had emerged.  The Court acknowledged that while the test the ALJ applied may not have “adequately balance[d] the employer’s interests, Pier Sixty did not object to the ALJ’s use of the test in evaluating Perez’s statements before the Board.”   Accordingly, the Court did not address the validity of the applied test.

Rather, Pier Sixty argued that the Board’s decision that the comments were not so egregious as to exceed the Act’s protection was not supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. The 2nd Circuit disagreed and found:

  • Although the post contained vulgar attacks, the subject matter of the message included workplace concerns.
  • Pier Sixty consistently tolerated widespread profanity amongst its workers, including supervisors, and had never before terminated any employees for such behavior until two days before the union election.
  • The location of the comments was an online mode of communication among coworkers and was not in the immediate presence of coworkers.

Accordingly, the Court found that the Board did not err in ruling that the post, while “vulgar and inappropriate,” was not so egregious as to exceed the NLRA’s protection.

Takeaways for Employers:

  • The Board will not apply the Atlantic Steel test to cases involving social media, even if the posts are public in nature, in light of the fact that the place of discussion is the internet and not face-to-face in the workplace.
  • Companies should ensure policies and handbooks comply with the NLRB’s current guidance on social media and do not interfere with employees engaging in protected concerted activity when off duty. However, while policies prohibiting vulgar and offensive comments need to be sensitive about infringing on NLRA-protected rights, employers should not hesitate to enforce those policies in appropriate circumstances.
  • Employee discipline should not be selectively enforced to prohibit behaviors that relate to union-related activities; discipline should be applied uniformly to all employees.

By:  Bryan Bienias, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed in part and rejected in part the National Labor Relations Board’s Banner Estrella decision regarding an employer’s requirement of confidentiality during workplace investigations. In doing so, the Court did not address, and essentially left intact, both the Board’s prohibition of blanket confidentiality instructions, and its requirement that employers determine the need for confidentiality on a case-by-case basis.

Last Friday, a three-member panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit punted on the opportunity to rein in the National Labor Relations Board’s restrictions on the ability of an employer to ensure confidentiality when conducting internal investigations.

The case, Banner Health System v. NLRB, No. 15-1245 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2017), addressed the non-profit healthcare system’s appeal of the Board’s controversial Banner Estrella decision (originally decided in 2012 and reaffirmed upon remand following Noel Canning).  There, the Board struck down as overbroad a confidentiality policy that prohibited employees from sharing salary and disciplinary information that had not been “shared” by the employee to whom it related.  The Board also found that the company unlawfully maintained a categorical policy of asking employees during investigatory interviews not to discuss certain kinds of human resources investigations.

The Board did not stop there, however, and announced a new rule prohibiting employers from promulgating blanket rules barring employee discussions concerning ongoing investigations. Instead, the Board held that an employer may only prohibit discussions regarding ongoing investigations if it demonstrates on a case-by-case basis that it has a legitimate and substantial business justification that outweighs employees’ Section 7 rights.  The employer must determine whether in any given investigation witnesses need protection, evidence is danger of being destroyed, testimony is in danger of being fabricated, and there was a need to prevent a cover up.

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s finding that the Company’s confidentiality agreement unlawfully barred its workers from sharing information related to terms and conditions of employment. In this context, the Court deferred to the Board’s conclusion that the confidentiality agreement “struck at the heartland of Section 7 activity without adequate justification” and held that the Agreement expressly reached information about salaries and employee discipline, which “is the sort of overbreadth our precedents squarely forbid.”  The Court also found the confidentiality agreement’s “safe harbor” provision, which allowed employees to discuss salary and discipline information when “shared by the employee,” too ambiguous to adequately protect employees’ right to share innocently obtained information.

However, the Court determined that the Board made “unwarranted logical leaps” and lacked substantial evidence to find that the Company unlawfully maintained a categorical policy of asking employees not to discuss certain kinds of human resources investigations.  The only evidence supporting the Board’s finding was an investigative interview form instructing investigators to request that interviewees not discuss the investigation with coworkers, along with vague testimony from an HR representative regarding how and when the script was utilized. The Court held that this evidence did not establish whether the Company, in practice, categorically requested investigative nondisclosure in all investigations.

Because the dearth of evidence “doomed” the Board’s order as to the investigation, the Court did not reach the Company’s or the amici’s arguments that the Board failed to balance employees’ Section 7 rights against employers’ interests in nondisclosure of workplace investigations.  Nor did it opine on the Board’s requirement of a case-by-case approach to justifying investigative confidentiality.

Takeaway

Despite the Court’s partial rejection of the Board’s Banner Estrella decision, the Board’s rules restricting employer’s use of routine confidentiality instructions during investigations remains the law of the land.  Employers should, therefore, continue refraining from issuing blanket confidentiality policies when conducting investigations.  Instead, employers must consider on a case-by-case basis whether confidentiality is truly needed, and only require confidentiality in those circumstances where it is reasonably required.

Should you have any questions about a current or proposed confidentiality policy, or requiring confidentiality during internal investigations, please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Labor & Employee Relations Team to be sure your company’s approach passes legal muster under current law.

Striking  By: Marshall B. Babson, Esq., Katherine Mendez, Esq., and Bryan Bienias, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: Several organizations are planning nationwide strikes and boycott activities on February 16-17 to oppose Trump Administration and Republican policies. Employers impacted by these activities should be mindful of employees’ rights before responding.

Several labor and activist groups are calling for national general strikes and boycotts this week to protest policies enacted and proposed by the new Trump Administration and the Republican Congress.

Thursday, February 16: A Day Without Immigrants. The first action, “A Day Without Immigrants,” is currently scheduled for this Thursday, February 16.  The campaign, promoted in Spanish and English, has been spread through Facebook, fliers, and word of mouth and calls on immigrants and their supporters “not to go to work, open businesses, shop, eat in restaurants, buy gas, go to classes, or send children to school.” While the campaign originally focused on the Washington D.C. area, the campaign is expected to spread nationwide. A similar action in Milwaukee, Wisconsin this past Monday, February 13 drew thousands of protesters.

Friday, February 17: National General Strike. Then, on Friday, February 17, a group called Strike4Democracy has called for a national general strike and plans on “over 100 strike actions across the United States, and beyond.” The campaign calls for participants to forgo work on Friday and, instead “plan or take part in an event in your community” and “occupy public space with positive messages of resistance and solidarity.”

The organizers do not plan on stopping there. They intend to use Friday’s national general strike to “build towards a series of mass strikes,” with another mass strike planned on March 8, 2017, another on May 1, 2017 (May Day), and “a heightening resistance throughout the summer.”

So, what does this mean for employers?

While these general strikes and those planned for the future could wreak havoc on an employer’s operations — as employees fail to report to work or leave shifts early — the National Labor Relations Act provides protection for employees who engage in political advocacy that relates specifically to job concerns and to other workplace issues.

Employers have the right to enforce “neutrally applied work rules” to restrict employees from leaving work for political activities unrelated to workplace concerns. As discussed above, whether an employee’s actions are protected or unprotected turns on whether the employee’s absence relates to activity directed at “terms and conditions of employment” which the employer controls or to workplace concerns that affect all employees. If the absence is due to political activity totally unrelated to workplace concerns, employees could be subject to discipline, although discipline is not necessarily the prudent course to take.

Given the myriad issues to be addressed in these strikes, from immigration reform to minimum wage laws to worker’s rights, employers may be hard pressed to show that employees who participate in these strikes in lieu of working have engaged in unprotected activity. Employers could find themselves in further “hot water” with the NLRB if they discipline employees for absenteeism or tardiness related to the employees’ political activities.

If your company is affected by any of the strike activity this week or in the months ahead, contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Labor & Employee Relations Team.

By: Michael Rybicki, Esq.

Seyfarth Summary: The relevance of the National Labor Relations Act to industries and business sectors that have not traditionally had to deal with its implications – such as hedge funds.

The New York Times recently ran on the front page of its business section a lengthy article discussing the National Labor Relation’s Board challenge to a number of provisions of an employment agreement that Bridgewater Associates, the world’s biggest hedge fund firm, requires each full-time employee to sign. Under the headline Confronting Wall Street’s Secretive Culture – N.L.R.B. Challenges Confidentiality Clauses, the article notes that the Board is challenging Bridgewater’s confidentiality, non-disparagement, and arbitration clauses and went on to state “[t]he unusual action is calling into question longstanding practices and prompting some companies to re-examine their employment agreements.”

With all deference to The Times, however, for a number of years the Board has been finding confidentiality provisions (see e.g., Target Corporation, 359 NLRB No. 103 (2013)) and non-disparagement clauses (see Dish Network Corporation, 359 NLRB No. 108 (2013)) unlawful and has steadfastly maintained, despite much criticism from the courts, that clauses restricting employees to arbitrating disputes are unlawful (D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 184 (2012)). If anything is “unusual” – if unsurprising – it is that the Board is going after a hedge fund.

Although many employers (and some of their attorneys) think that the application of the National Labor Relations Act is limited to union-represented employees or at least limited to union or union-related activities, such as collective bargaining, union organizing, or union strikes, hand billing, picketing, or boycotts, the Act’s coverage is much broader. As the Board’s website notes:

  • The NLRA applies to most private sector employers, including manufacturers, retailers, private universities, and health care facilities.
  • Employees at union and non-union workplaces have the right to help each other by sharing information, signing petitions and seeking to improve wages and working conditions in a variety of ways.See NLRB Website: FAQ’s.

The Complaint against Bridgewater (Case Number: 01-CA-169426 (06/30/2016)) is not the first one in the financial sector. For example, as Seyfarth Attorney Ashley Laken noted, the D.C. Circuit recently upheld the Board’s finding that the confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions of Quicken Loan’s employment agreements (see our earlier blog post here) violated the Act.

Confidentiality agreements, for example, can be drafted to lawfully prohibit the disclosure of a wide variety of confidential information, see e.g., GC MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, Case 7 (pp. 17-18) (a rule by a drugstore chain prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information lawful where the rule was clearly in the context of not disclosing personal health information); see also GC MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, p. 20 [Walmart, Case 11-CA-067171] (finding lawful a rule requiring employees to maintain the confidentiality of the employer’s trade secret and confidential information where rule was sufficiently contextualized by examples of prohibited disclosures (i.e., information regarding the development of systems, processes, products, know-how and technology, internal reports, policies, procedures or other internal business-related communications) for employees to understand that it does not reach protected communications about working conditions).

It seems reasonably clear, however, that too often the implications of the NLRA for industries and sectors that have not traditionally had to deal with issues arising under the Act are not considered. Further, even where they are at least considered, frequently all that is done is to include a so-called “savings clause,” stating in effect that nothing contained in an employment agreement, handbook, or work rule, shall be construed as restricting activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act. The Board, however, routinely finds such clauses ineffective. Chipotle Services LLC d/b/a Chipotle Mexican Grill, 364 NLRB No. 72 (2016); see also ISS Facility Services, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 160 (2016).

As noted, the National Labor Relations Act applies to most private sector employers, including industries and business sectors that have not traditionally had to deal with issues arising under its provisions. However, because it provides for only compensatory damages and generally does not offer the opportunity for attorney’s fees, it has generally been ignored by the Plaintiff’s Bar. But in today’s digital age, where employees can readily become aware of the Act’s scope via social media and online content providers, the Act’s implications need to be considered by almost all private sector employers when drafting employment agreements, handbooks, and work rules –  areas into which the Board clearly is looking to expand its effective reach.

By:  Christopher W. Kelleher, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: The NLRB ruled that students who work as teaching assistants at colleges and universities are “employees” under the NLRA and are thus permitted to engage in collective bargaining.

On August 23, 2016, the National Labor Relations Board issued a 3-1 decision in Columbia University, Case 02-RC-143012, holding that private college and university student assistants — including undergraduates — who perform services in connection with their studies, are “employees” under Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, and therefore have the right to bargain collectively.

In doing so, the Board overruled Brown University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), which held that student assistants are not statutory employees. The ruling directly contradicts the Board’s treatment of students under the Act for nearly all of its 80-year history.

Because Section 2(3) does not adequately define the term “employee,” the Board looked to common law agency principles to determine whether student assistants are covered. The Board thus found that even when the economic relationship “may seem comparatively slight” relative to the academic relationship, “the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the employer’s control, suffices to establish an employment relationship[.]” The Board found no compelling statutory or policy considerations to hold otherwise. The decision applies only to private schools and universities.

Member Miscimarra, the Board’s lone dissenter, argued that the relationship between the students and the university is “primarily educational,” and thus does not fit “the complexities of industrial life.” The dissent warned that the Majority disregarded “what hangs in the balance when a student’s efforts to attain [a] … degree are governed by the risks and uncertainties of collective bargaining and the potential resort to economic weapons” such as strikes, slowdowns, lockouts, and litigation.

NLRB 2By: Karla E. Sanchez, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit and the NLRB in finding that mandatory arbitration agreements that require all claims to be brought by employees on an individual basis violate the NLRA.

On August 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, Case No. 13-16599, holding that an arbitration agreement which required employees to individually bring legal claims against their employer exclusively through arbitration violated Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).

In the case, an employee who had signed the arbitration agreement brought a class and collective action against the employer alleging employee misclassification to deny overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).   The employer moved to compel arbitration arguing that the employees had to individually arbitrate their respective claims.  The trial court agreed and ordered individual arbitrations.

The Ninth Circuit reversed finding that concerted litigation—class or collective action—is protected activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, is a substantive right under the NLRA, and cannot be waived. Notably, Section 7 of the Act protects employees’ rights to, among other things, “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).  The Court held that concerted activity, is the “essential, substantive right” established by the NLRA. Id. slip op.at  6.   The Ninth Circuit then noted that Section 8 of the Act “enforces” the rights provided in Section 7, including engaging in concerted activities, by making it an unfair labor practice to interfere with these rights Id. slip op. at  9.  Given that Section 7 grants a right to engage in concerted activity and Section 8 precludes an employer from interfering with employees’ Section 7 rights, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an employer violates the Act by: 1) conditioning employment on signing an agreement that precludes collective and class actions, and 2) interfering with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the employer that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) required the enforcement of the arbitration agreement, finding that at issue here was the fact that the agreement required individual litigation and not that it required arbitration. Under the majorities’ reasoning, it would have found the same violation if the agreement required all suits to be brought in court if the suits had to be brought on an individual basis.  The Court further noted that the “FAA does not mandate the enforcement of contract terms that waive substantive federal rights.” Id. at slip op 18.

The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis, finding that while the NLRA “protects concerted activity, it does not give employees an unwaivable right to proceed as a group to arbitrate or litigate disputes.” Id. at slip op. 37.  The dissent found that the NLRA did not create a substantive right to litigate collective and class actions and concluded “nothing in the text, legislative history, or purposes of [Section] 7 precludes enforcement of an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver.” Id. at slip op. 37.

Through the Court’s decision in Morris, the Ninth Circuit joins the Seventh Circuit in finding that arbitration agreements waiving collective legal action violate the Act. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., — F.3d –, 2016 WL 3029464 (7th Cir. 2016).  The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that the NLRA does not invalidate these agreements.

Given the split in the circuits, cases dealing with these type of mandatory class action waiver agreements will likely continue to be litigated until the Supreme Court rules on this issue.

Employers with these type of agreements need to consider whether they want to maintain these agreements in light of the current split and whether they are better served by making changes to their existing agreements. Employers concerned about their arbitration agreements are advised to consult with their labor and employment attorneys.

Red Light   By: Alison Loomis, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: A challenge to Seattle’s first-of-its-kind ordinance, which established the right for on-demand drivers to collectively bargain, was dismissed by a Washington federal court on the basis that the suing entity lacked standing. 

Seattle recently enacted an ordinance granting “on-demand” drivers the right to bargain collectively. The ordinance, which took effect on January 22, 2016, established a mechanism through which a union could request recognition as a qualified driver representative (“QDR”) for on-demand drivers, and ultimately, negotiate pay and conditions of employment on their behalf with their driver coordinator company (such as, for example, Uber).  If recognition was granted, the QDR would contact the company whose drivers it seeks to represent to obtain the drivers’ contact information.  Once the QDR had the contact information, it could then solicit those drivers regarding their interest in union representation.  If and when a majority of the drivers expressed interest in representation, the city of Seattle would certify the QDR as the exclusive driver representative for all drivers associated with that driver coordinator and the driver coordinator would be required to negotiate with the QDR regarding topics including payment, hours and conditions of work, and equipment standards.

On March 3, 2016, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a trade group that has two driver coordinator companies as members, filed a complaint against the city of Seattle, alleging, among other things, that the ordinance was preempted by the NLRA and the Sherman Antitrust Act. Chambers claimed that the ordinance would “restrict the market freedom relied upon for all for-hire drivers who are part of independent-contractor arrangements” and would “insert a third-party labor union into the relationship between independent contractors and companies.”  In seeking an injunction to stop the enforcement of the ordinance, Chambers alleged that two of its member companies suffered present harm and would likely face a “substantial risk of injury” in the future as a result of the ordinance.

The city of Seattle filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that Chambers did not have the requisite standing. In granting the city’s motion, the District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle noted that the Chambers’ two member driver coordinator companies had not yet suffered harm, even if they faced the eventual prospect of a union organizing drive.  The court dismissed the lawsuit “without prejudice,” meaning that Chambers can effectively revive the action at a later date, assuming it gains standing.

In the interim, we’ll wait until the light turns green, and a challenge to this legislation ripens.

 By:  Susan Jeanblanc Cohen, Esq.

Seyfarth Synopsis: In a split decision, the NLRB ruled that off-duty employees of an acute care hospital had the right to picket the hospital’s main lobby entrance.

After the collective bargaining agreement between acute care hospital Capital Medical Center (“the Hospital”) and UFCW Local 21 (“the Union”) expired on September 30, 2012 and the parties engaged in negotiations for months, the Union and some bargaining unit employees decided to engage in picketing and handbilling at the Hospital.  During this union activity, off-duty employees distributed handbills at the main lobby entrance of the hospital and the physicians’ pavilion entrance. In addition, a group of employees distributed handbills and carried picket signs along the public sidewalk next to the hospital driveway.  The Hospital did not interfere with these activities.  Later in the day, at least two off-duty employees went to the main lobby entrance of the Hospital with their picket signs, and one of the employees also distributed leaflets at the lobby entrance for a short period of time while holding her picket sign.  The Hospital informed the picketing employees that they were welcome to remain at the doorway and hand out leaflets, but that they were not allowed on Hospital property with their picket signs.  The picketers disregarded their employer’s instruction and remained at the lobby entrance with their picket signs.  The Hospital contacted the police, who said he would not force the picketers to leave because they were not being disruptive or blocking doors or ingress and egress.

In Capital Medical Center, 364 NLRB No. 69 (August 12, 2016), a split panel of the NLRB decided that the Hospital violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by attempting to prevent the off-duty employees from picketing, threatening the employees with discipline and arrest for engaging in picketing, and contacting the police in an effort to have the picketing ended.  The majority did not rule that off-duty employees have an absolute right to picket a hospital’s lobby entrance, but cited the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) that employee rights under Section 7 of the NLRA must be balanced against employer property rights and business interests.  Accordingly, picketing could be restricted if an employer shows that the restriction is required to maintain discipline and production.  Recognizing that acute care hospitals involve special considerations, the majority noted that hospitals may prohibit picketing in non-patient care areas if necessary to prevent patient disturbance or disruption of health care operations.  However, the majority decided that the Hospital did not show that the picketing in this case created any such disturbance or disruption or that restricting picketing was required to maintain discipline and production.  The majority felt that the presence of individuals peacefully holding picket signs near the main entrance to the Hospital was not likely to be any more disruptive or disturbing than the handbilling that the Hospital allowed.

The dissent, Member Miscimarra, felt that the majority improperly applied standards governing on-premises solicitation and distribution and applied them to on-premises picketing, noting that picketing is very different than other modes of communication and that the very presence of picketers on hospital property could disturb patients entering and exiting the facility. Member Miscimarra opined that the Hospital should have been allowed to restrict the on-premises picketing in this case.

 Employer Takeaway: Be prepared to allow off-duty employees to come onto employer property and even position themselves at entrances  while holding picket signs. Before restricting off-duty employees from such picketing, make sure there is evidence of real potential patient disturbance or disruption.  Conclusory statements that picketers could deter patients (or customers) from entering or, the acute care context, impact the healing environment will be insufficient.  In the case the a hospital, the NLRB will likely want to see evidence of the following types of behavior for a hospital to be able to lawfully restrict picketing:  patrolling the doorway, marching in formation, chanting and making noise, creating a barrier to entrances/exits, or other behavior that actually disturbed patients or disrupted hospital operations.